Recent work in sequential program semantics has produced both an operational (He et al., Sci. Comput. Programming 28(2, 3) (1997) 171-192) UK, 1990) deÿnes probabilistic partial correctness for probabilistic, but again not demonic programs. In this paper we combine all the above, giving an operational and axiomatic framework for both partial and total correctness of probabilistic and demonic sequential programs; among other things, that provides the theory to support our earlier -and practical -publication on probabilistic demonic loops (Morgan, in: Jifeng et al. (Eds.), Proc.
Introduction
An operational model provides a concrete description of realistic program behaviour; on the other hand, program logic is more suited to validation. Thus, a compelling aim is to encapsulate a plausible operational model as an interpretation of a system of logical axioms. In this paper we treat these two themes for probabilistic programming.
It has long been understood that demonic nondeterminism, the mathematical notion encapsulating 'abstraction', is vital for retaining simplicity in reasoning and expression [3] . The introduction of probability, a special but distinct case of (demonic) nondeterminism, leads to some unexpected consequences [20] , and this observation together with the realisation that the distinction is (among other things) necessary for the realistic modelling of many probabilistic distributed algorithms suggests that instead of discarding one in favour of the other, rather both should coexist and be understood in any useful model. (Segala gives a nice exposition of these issues [24] .) The wish to understand nontermination needs no explanation.
Thus our ÿrst contribution is theoretical: it is a correspondence between operational and logical descriptions of sequential, probabilistic, demonically nondeterministic and possibly nonterminating programs. This result is achieved by using a 'quantitative logic' whose expressions represent probabilistic rather than absolute judgements concerning program correctness.
Others have studied logic and probability besides ourselves, but since nondeterminism, probability and nontermination together pose a real challenge [7, p. 200] , one ÿnds simpler, more idealistic situations in the literature. Either the logics are not quantitative (thus only events with deÿnite 0 or 1 probabilities can be analysed) [23] , or of those that do allow quantitative judgements none treat (in addition) both nontermination and nondeterminism [20, 7, 2] . The novelty here is that we account for all three.
A second contribution is practical: it is a justiÿcation, using our program logic, of invariant=variant principles based on wp and wlp [3] for probabilistic demonic loops, thus (ÿnally) setting the validation of small, probabilistic programs on a par with standard methods.
Crucial in this are the axioms of the quantitative logic that characterise feasible program behaviour. Their discovery relies on our theoretical analysis, and yet they provide the key for the nonobvious yet sound (compositional) probabilistic judgements in nondeterministic and (possibly) nonterminating environments.
This beautiful connection between operational models and quantitative logic, allowing the developments here of simple proof rules, was originally revealed in the early 1980s by Kozen [14] and subsequently by Jones [2] both of whom broke new ground by showing that pure probabilistic computations could be explained using standard domain theoretical constructions applied to an underlying domain containing probability distributions. Later Morgan et al. [20] extended that idea to a more complicated powerdomain, successfully combining probabilistic and demonic nondeterministic behaviour; in doing so they showed that the generalisation to real-valued expectations is (unlike in Kozen's and Jones' pure probabilistic setting) fundamental for retaining compositionality [19] . The ÿnal (missing) ingredient -nontermination -can be added similarly by using the still more complicated Plotkin construction; we set out that construction here in Section 2.
But our practical goal -a sound justiÿcation of the separation of correctness and termination (Sections 4 and 5) -can only be demonstrated with this construction provided that the resulting Plotkin powerdomain decomposes into the corresponding Smyth and Hoare powerdomains, for they model, respectively, terminating and nonterminating behaviour. General results from domain theory guarantee that vital decomposition for certain kinds of underlying powerdomain, and the pleasant surprise is that both discrete and continuous probability distributions are amenable specialisations -although we must use a nonstandard domain for the continuous case [4] .
Our tendency though is to favour the discrete distributions, and not only because of their marked simplicity when compared with the continuous case. Most published probabilistic algorithms only generate discrete distributions, and hence a 'discrete theory' is almost always su cient; but more generally still, one could argue (as Kozen does [13] ) that probabilistic computations themselves are essentially discrete in nature. Thus the construction for the continuous case is sketched in a separate section (Section 6).
An extensive discussion of examples, and the general treatment of loops, is given elsewhere [17] .
Throughout we use inÿx dot ':' for function application, associating to the left so that f: x:y means (f(x))(y); and we write ':=' for 'is deÿned to be equal to'.
A convex powerdomain of distributions
In this section we consider some general results of powerdomains specialised to a domain of probability distributions.
In program semantics, powerdomains are used to study nondeterminism, a phenomenon arising when a program might output any one of some set of results rather than a single, determined function of its input. The details of any powerdomain are proscribed by the way it orders those result sets, and the particular choice of order depends on criteria which can be explained in terms of the desired treatment of programs' possible nonterminating behaviour. All, however, regard nondeterminism as demonic, and thus they provide the starting point for extending probability.
The Symth order 1 (Deÿnition B3) treats nontermination as the worst behaviour and thus the Smyth powerdomain models total correctness. Similarly, the Hoare order (Definition B4) models partial correctness: nontermination is treated as the best outcome in that order. The Plotkin powerdomain (Deÿnition B2) uses the Egli-Milner order (Definition B5) and combines both views; thus that is what we shall use in our operational semantics.
Recursion is an obvious 'source' of nonterminating behaviour, and as usual we shall model it as a least ÿxed point (with respect to the Egli-Milner order); a principal concern therefore is to ensure that any Egli-Milner limit can be recovered as a Smyth limit and Hoare limit separately, for only then can the Egli-Milner order alone be used to encode the other two, and thus provide a basis for the sound separation of correctness reasoning into partial and total. If such is the case, we say that the Plotkin powerdomain is decomposable (into the Smyth and Hoare powerdomains).
In general, the Plotkin powerdomain is not decomposable, but in some special cases it is: Abramsky and Jung [1] show that one such case is when the underlying domain is !-continuous (Deÿnition B10), and the main result of this section is to exhibit this concretely for a domain of probability distributions.
We begin by summarising some consequences of Abramsky and Jung's resultsspeciÿcally they prove an isomorphism [1] (reproduced here in Theorem B.1) between the abstract Plotkin powerdomain over an !-continuous complete partial order and the space of lenses. We write (D; 6) for a (general) !-continuous complete partial order, and (Lens(D); 6 TEM ) (Deÿnition B13) for its associated space of lenses. Lens(D) is important because it provides a suitable powerdomain of Egli-Milner closed sets (Deÿnition B2) of D, whilst the isomorphism provides us with decomposition results on that powerdomain.
In general, a set is Egli-Milner closed if it is the intersection of an up-closed (Smythclosed) set (Deÿnition B1) and a down-closed (Hoare-closed) set (Deÿnition B1). A subset of D is contained in Lens(D) if it is the intersection of a Scott-compact (Deÿnition B12) up-closed set and a Scott-closed (Deÿnition B11) (hence down-closed) set. Together the conditions imply that elements in Lens(D) are Scott-compact, and in any case are Egli-Milner-closed. The additional closure conditions will provide us with our decomposition results.
Next, we describe the two corollaries of the general isomorphism Theorem B.1 which imply that even directed limits of elements in Lens(D) can be decomposed into two sets, one representing the Smyth limit and the other the Hoare limit separately. We write EM , S and H for, respectively, the Egli-Milner, Smyth and Hoare limits. For a subset A of D we write sc: A for the smallest Scott-closed set containing A (Deÿnition B11). Corollary 2.1. For any 6 TEM -directed subset A of Lens(D) the limit TEM A exists; and satisÿes
(Insisting on closure after H can be seen as a continuity condition, 2 and in any case it selects the least lens greater than all those in A.)
Proof. The lemma is a consequence of the isomorphism between the abstract Plotkin powerdomain (Deÿnition B15) and the space (Lens(D); 6 TEM ). Both the limit and its 2 Consider the 6 TEM chain on sets of real intervals in [0; 1],
which has limit {1} (the limit point of the underlying series). The union of the down sets is the half-closed interval [0; 1), but the intersection of the up sets is {1}. Failing to limit-close the Hoare limit would produce an empty result. Nevertheless, {1} is the least lens in [0; 1] greater than all the lenses in the chain.
decomposition (1) exist in the abstract powerdomain in general [12] , and the isomorphism is given by Abramsky and Jung [1] and is reproduced here in Theorem B.1.
The next result shows that the TEM limit determines the Smyth limit (in the Smyth ordering) and the Hoare limit (in the Hoare ordering). We write ≡ S , ≡ H , respectively, for Smyth equivalence and Hoare equivalence (Deÿnition B17) between elements in Lens(D): our lemma below shows in addition that the limits are indistinguishable relative to the appropriate equivalences. Corollary 2.2. For any 6 EM -directed subset A of Lens(D); the following equivalences hold:
Proof. This too is a property of abstract Plotkin powerdomains [12] , and so follows from the isomorphism (Theorem B.1) used in the proof of Corollary 2.1.
We now turn speciÿcally to probabilistic semantics: our task is to exploit the general result Corollary 2.2 to a domain of probability distributions, and for that we need only show that our space of interest is !-continuous.
We write S for the state space and assume (for now) that it is countable. The space of (discrete) probability distributions 3 over S is deÿned as follows. These special distributions are more precisely called discrete sub-probability measures [11] ; they do not necessarily sum to 1, and the deÿcit gives the probability of nontermination. The 'everywhere zero' distribution for example, that assigns zero probability to all states, models nowhere-terminating behaviour. (An alternative though less convenient treatment would assign probability 1 to some special state ⊥.)
Now, we show that ( S; ) is an !-continuous complete partial order.
Lemma 2.4. For a countable state space S; its distributions ( S; ) form an !-continuous complete partial order.
Proof. The completeness of ( S; ) is trivial, given the completeness of the interval [0; 1] under 6 over the reals.
To show that S is !-continuous we need only exhibit a countable basis (Deÿnition B9). One such is the set of distributions contained in
where F ↓ T is the function equal to F on T , and to zero outside of T , and P Fin S is the set of ÿnite subsets of S. Since S is countable, so is (2), and moreover since any real is the least upper bound of rationals way-below it (Deÿnition B8), we have a basis.
Lemma 2.4 shows that (Lens( S); TEM ) satisÿes conditions necessary for the decomposition of Corollary 2.2, but that space is only relevant in our context provided the order TEM between lenses reduces to the ordinary Egli-Milner order EM since the latter is what we use in program semantics. The next lemma shows that to be the case. Proof. We show for any lens A that ↓A = sc:( ↓ A), for (from Deÿnitions B16 and B5) that is su cient to imply correspondence of the orders. First, we note that ↓ A ⊆ sc:( ↓ A), thus we shall concentrate on the alternative inclusion. Let the limit a in sc:( ↓ A) be generated by the chain a 0 a 1 a 2 · · ·, where a i ∈ ↓A for all i. The result follows provided that a ∈ ↓A, or equivalently if A ∩ ↑{a} = ∅. We reason as follows:
For the deferred justiÿcation, we note ÿrst that the sets A ∩ ↑{a i } form a chain (with respect to reverse subset inclusion) of nonempty, compact sets: each set A ∩ ↑{a i } is compact because it is an intersection of two compact sets (A is a lens, thus is compact, whereas ↑{a i } is the up-closure of a singleton, also compact), and in S the intersection of compact sets is compact. We are now ready to deÿne a Plotkin-style powerdomain for probability distributions. We select a subset of Lens( S) as follows by imposing the further closure condition of '(probabilistic) convexity' (deÿned below) (because in our application to probability, taking the whole of Lens( S) is still not suitable for probabilistic program semantics). For distributions F; F in S and p in [0; 1] we can form F p ⊕ F , the weighted average, deÿned pointwise over S as p × F + (1−p) × F (with usual scalar multiplication and addition). 
Our convexity condition -the only novel closure condition in this context, but one we have used elsewhere [20, 9] -ensures (among other things) that, in a programming context, nondeterministic choice can always be 'reÿned by' probabilistic choice. Other laws between program operators also hold because of the convex condition, and a full description of them can be found elsewhere [9] .
Our probabilistic powerdomain over S is deÿned next.
Deÿnition 2.7. The convex powerdomain (CS; EM ) over the space of distributions S comprises the (probabilistically) convex sets in Lens( S). Its order EM is the usual Egli-Milner order (Deÿnition B5).
Our ÿnal task for this section is to show that the decomposition results Corollaries 2.1 and 2.2 apply even within CS. That at last gives us the main result of this section: Egli-Milner limits in CS determine separately the Smyth and Hoare limits.
Theorem 2.8. For any EM -directed subset A of CS; the following equivalences hold:
Proof. Given Lemmas 2.4 and 2.5, the result follows immediately from Corollaries 2.1 and 2.2 provided the additional closure condition on CS, namely convexity, holds of S A ∩ sc:( H A) in the case that all the elements of A themselves are convex. That follows from these elementary facts: up-closing preserves convexity ( -monotonicity of p ⊕); the intersection of convex sets is convex; down-closing preserves convexity (similar to up-closing); the union of a ⊆-directed set of sets is convex; and limit-closing preserves convexity ( -continuity of p ⊕).
This section has deÿned the convex powerdomain, whose use for modelling probabilistic imperative programs now follows from the constructions for the Smyth-style domain [9] : for example the sequential composition is a generalised functional composition; nondeterministic choice is union (then convex closure); and the probabilistic choice is weighted average as deÿned above. In Section 3 we give further details.
For recursion one takes limits of chains, and here is the signiÿcance of Theorem 2.8: we must be sure that taking the limit in the convex domain agrees with the more specialised limit in the Smyth domain and the Hoare domain -for that is what allows us to use the more general convex domain for either. It is known that the equivalence holds for standard (nonprobabilistic) domains; Theorem 2.8 conÿrms the preservation of the property when probability is included. Now, we turn to programs and logic.
Probabilistic programs and logic
The results of the last section have provided the tools for an operational model, which (via the Egli-Milner order) captures the essence of both termination and nontermination. We now consider how to characterise that model using axioms of a quantitative logic, beginning with a review of traditional methods.
Over standard (nonprobabilistic) demonic programs, a popular model for total correctness is S → SS ⊥ , where S ⊥ is the at domain extending state space S with ⊥ for nontermination, and S forms the Smyth powerdomain over that; Dijkstra's weakest 'ordinary' preconditions PS → PS [3] support a programming logic suitable for total correctness. For partial correctness one can use S → HS ⊥ (Hoare) for the model and weakest 'liberal' preconditions for the logic. Finally, although partial and total correctness are available simultaneously via S → GS ⊥ (Plotkin), for r in S → GS ⊥ and postcondition Q in PS still it is more convenient to deÿne separately wp:r:Q := {s | r:s ⊆ Q} weakest precondition wlp:r:Q := {s | r:s ⊆ Q ⊥ } weakest liberal precondition (3) to give the total (wp) and partial (wlp) programming logics. Note that the deÿnitions (3) work together only over GS ⊥ (the intersection of HS ⊥ and SS ⊥ ) -wp does not work over HS ⊥ and wlp does not work over SS ⊥ . (Nelson [21] gives a nice treatment of the issues.) For probabilistic programs, He et al. [9] propose S → C S S for total correctness, where C S S is convex like CS of the previous section, but based on the Smyth order. Morgan et al. [20] provide a probabilistic 'greatest pre-expectation' logic for that, where expec-tations are nonnegative real-valued functions over the state space (extending Kozen's treatment [14] for nondemonic programs).
To access total and partial correctness simultaneously, by analogy with the standard case we replace He's Smyth-based C S S by our more sophisticated Egli-Milner-based CS. From there we could go on immediately to generalise wp and wlp separately (as at (3) above), but we do not do so. Instead we allow expectations to range over negative as well as nonnegative values: we deÿne ewp, the operator underlying the other two logics, which exactly characterises our operational model and from which they can be extracted. Roughly speaking, total correctness results are obtained from nonnegative postexpectations and partial correctness results from nonpositive. That we can unify partial and total correctness with a single expectation transformer speaks of the greater expressivity of numbers when compared with the booleans.
We begin the details with the construction of the operational model for probabilistic, demonic model of programs. Deÿnition 3.1. For a countable state space S the space of (discrete) probabilistic, demonic programs (MS; EM ) is given by
with the order induced pointwise from CS, so that for r; r in MS we deÿne r EM r := (∀s: S)(r:s EM r :s):
We occasionally use S and H over MS, analogously lifted from CS.
Thus, our programs take initial states to sets of ÿnal distributions: the plurality of the sets represents demonic nondeterminism; the distributions they contain each represent probabilistic nondeterminism.
The next task is to investigate the dual representation of programs as expectation transformers. We extend the expectations found in [20, 17] , where the topic was total correctness (the Smyth order and up-closed sets) and expectations were of type S → [0; 1], by using [−1; 1] instead: we write ES for S → [−1; 1], and use lower-case Greek letters for typical elements. 4 Expectation transformers TS are thus functions of type ES → ES. We write F for the expected value of in ES averaged over distribution F in S. 5 As a special case of expectations, we interpret predicates as {0; 1}-valued functions of the state space, and for predicate A holding at state s we write either s ∈ A or A:s = 1 as convenient. For a scalar c we write c for the constant expectation evaluating to c over all of S. 4 We restrict expectations to the interval [−1; 1] because it is more convenient for our application to partial correctness. However, for the general program logic Deÿnition 3.2, the restriction is only apparent since those transformers are scaling (a consequence of Deÿnition 3.8) implying that by suitably scaling the post condition to lie in that range, the e ect of program behaviour on bounded functions generally can be determined by functions over [−1; 1]. 5 The expected value for a discrete distribution F is actually given by s:S :s×F:s.
With those conventions the predicates true and false correspond to the expectations 1 and 0 respectively. Finally, for relations between expectations we write V -everywhere no more than ≡ -everywhere equal to W -everywhere no less than; so that we generalise, respectively, implication, equivalence and reverse implication on predicates. 6 Our logic is based on the 'extended greatest pre-expectation transformer', deÿned as follows. The e ect of the deÿnition is to consider all possible post-distributions F in r: s, and then demonically to choose the one that gives the least (the 'worst') expectation for the post-expectation : thus nondeterminism is demonic in that it minimises the pre-expectation at each initial state, and Deÿnition 3.2 is then the greatest expectation everywhere no more than those pointwise minima.
For standard programs, if executing a program r from a state s is certain to establish a postcondition A then that state is contained in the associated weakest precondition; with our deÿnition we would have ewp:r: A: s = 1. For probabilistic programs, if the standard postcondition A is established with only a probability at least p say, then the greatest preexpectation on executing r from s initially is at least p and we have ewp:r: A: s = p. 7 Thus as a special case, when A is a predicate we can interpret ewp:r: A: s as the greatest assured probability that A holds after execution of r from s. Now, we discover the various reÿnement orders over TS that correspond via ewp with orders over the operational MS. First, we generalise the observation from standard programming (e.g. [21] ) that the Smyth order on programs corresponds to the implication order lifted to predicate transformers and that the Hoare order similarly corresponds to (lifted) reverse implication. We use PS (typical element ) to denote the set of nonnegative valued expectations and NS (typical element ) for the nonpositive valued expectations. They are both subsets of ES. For the deferred justiÿcation we appeal to the monotonicity of the arithmetic over nonnegative arguments without subtraction: r:s di ers from ↑(r:s) only by the addition of 'larger elements' according to Deÿnition 2.3, and the minimum selection on the left cannot be increased by removing the up-closure.
The result now follows by generalising on s, and a similar argument justiÿes the second statement (but note the reversal W). 
That the Egli-Milner order between programs is preserved under ewp now follows directly. The corollary shows only that ewp is an order-preserving mapping between (MS; EM ) and (TS; EM ). The next result, the converse of Corollary 3.5, shows that it is also an injection, and therefore that programs can be modelled equivalently either as relations or as expectation transformers.
Lemma
and F ∈ r :s:
From (4) 
We have thus shown that ewp order-embeds MS into TS.
But there are many EM -monotonic expectation transformers that are not ewp-images of MS. The ÿnal result of this section completes our exact logical characterisation of the convex powerdomain: we identify 'healthiness conditions' over TS in the style of Dijkstra [3] (for standard programs) and of Morgan et al. [20] (for probabilistic programs) that distinguish (images through ewp of) programs of MS within it. The importance of the result is that theorems proved within TS about healthy expectation transformers correspond to theorems about programs in MS.
The ÿrst healthiness condition is a slight generalisation of the sublinearity of Morgan [20] .
A second condition is bounded continuity: transformers satisfy bounded continuity provided they distribute up-(down-) directed limits in PS (NS).
We note ÿrst that both sublinearity and bounded continuity are satisÿed by all images of MS under ewp.
Lemma 3.9. Any expectation transformer ewp:r; for r in MS; is sublinear and boundedly continuous.
Proof. Deÿnition 3.2, compactness of programs' result sets and properties of arithmetic ( [20, 15] give more detailed proofs).
For total correctness (for the Smyth C S ), sublinearity and bounded continuity tell the whole story [20, 15, Theorem 8:7] ; in our more general CS however, there are sublinear elements of MS that are not ewp-images. Take for example S to be the two-element state space {x; y}, and consider the result set {F : S | F:x = F:y}:
It is convex, but not Egli-Milner closed; 8 its associated expectation transformer formed by ewp is sublinear, but it is not the ewp-image of any element of MS.
The characterisation of Egli-Milner closure is captured by a second healthiness condition -'partial linearity' -which states that t: depends only on the pre-expectations of t applied to expectations in PS ∪ NS. Deÿnition 3.10. An expectation transformer, t in TS is said to be partially linear if for all states s in S, and all expectations in ES which are zero on all but a ÿnite subset of S, there are expectations in PS and in NS such that = + and t: :s = t: :s + t: :s: 8 In fact, its closure is {F : S | F: x; F: y6 1 2 }, from which it is indistinguishable using ewp for any in PS ∪ NS.
Note that the implicit existential quantiÿcation in Deÿnition 3.10 means there may be many decompositions of as a sum + . 9 We complete the correspondence between healthy expectation transformers and MS with the next theorem, which we state only. The proof is omitted as it is overly technical and not necessary for the rest of the paper. Theorem 3.11. An expectation transformer t in TS is boundedly continuous; sublinear and partially linear if and only if there is r in MS such that t = ewp:r.
Theorem 3.11 concludes our logical characterisation of our convex powerdomain. In the next section we turn to applications, and discover that the healthiness conditions of this section are crucial for justifying a modular treatment of partial and total correctness in the probabilistic context.
Partial and total correctness
In this section we focus explicitly on partial and total correctness; we give our promised formulations of wp and wlp, both of which are specialisations of the more general ewp of the last section, and generalisations of the standard logics [3] . For the new logics we restrict to PS, however: essentially we seek to generalise the discrete domain {0; 1} (on which predicates are based) to the continuous domain [0; 1], so that the transformers give partial rather than absolute judgements of program behaviour. The distingished elements 0 and 1 remain, respectively, as the least and greatest elements under V ; those roles will assume signiÿcance when we look for least and greatest ÿxed points.
For a total correctness logic we merely restrict ewp to PS directly, and use the order V .
Deÿnition 4.1. Let r be a program in MS; then the greatest preexpectation of program r with respect to postexpectation in PS, associating 0 with nontermination, is deÿned wp:r: := ewp:r: :
Well deÿnedness follows easily from sublinearity: if is in PS then 0 V ewp:r: V 1;
9 A more alluring healthiness condition would be that t: is determined by its positive part ( 0) and its negative part ( 0); but t: = t:( 0) + t:( 0); does not hold for general probabilistic programs, although it does in the restricted set of standard programs and {0; 1; −1}-valued expectations [18] . so that wp:r: is in PS also. Moreover Lemma 3.3 shows that this wp semantics of programs corresponds to a relational model with the Smyth ordering [20] -nontermination is the worst outcome in both semantics. For partial correctness we deÿne a probabilistic wlp; again we restrict to the subspace (PS; V ).
Deÿnition 4.2.
10 Let r be a program in MS; then the greatest liberal preexpectation of program r with respect to the postexpectation in PS, associating 1 with nontermination, is wlp:r: := 1 + ewp:r:( − 1):
Again it follows easily from sublinearity of ewp:r that for in NS, −1 V ewp:r: V 0 and thus since − 1 lies in NS, so does ewp:r:( − 1) from which we deduce that wlp:r is a well-deÿned expectation transformer in PS → PS. Also Lemma 3.3 implies that the wlp semantics corresponds to a relational model with the Hoare orderingaccordingly nontermination is the best outcome.
Next, we set out alternative (but equivalent) semantics for a simple programming language in Figs. 1 and 2 from which the wlp and wp semantics can also be derived. Observe that nondeterministic choice selects the pointwise minimum between expectations, re ecting the demon's striving for the worst result, whereas probabilistic choice p ⊕ selects the weighted average between the two results. In both semantics recursion is dealt with by least ÿxed points in the appropriate orders: Theorem 3.7 showed that the two orders correspond.
We contrast the two semantics with a small example. Let S be some ÿnite portion of N, and for natural number N write s := N for the assignment taking every initial state to the ÿnal state N . The program 
which is a demonic generalisation of the probabilistic wlp deÿned only for nondemonic programs by Jones [11] . Morgan [18] shows that (6) also generalises standard wlp [3] . 
Thus the wp observation gives the greatest guaranteed probability of termination at 0 -and nontermination guarantees nothing. The wlp observation, on the other hand, returns the probability that either 0 is reached or the program fails to terminate -the usual interpretation for partial correctness. Perhaps the most telling di erence between wp and wlp lies in the analysis of an explicit recursion. It is easy to show the wp semantics of a looping program is given by the least ÿxed point of a monotonic function in the V order lifted to transformers, whereas in the wlp semantics it is the greatest ÿxed point. This follows from Deÿnition 4.2 since the least ÿxed point of a T -monotonic function becomes specialised ÿrst to W on NS → NS, and ÿnally is shifted to PS → PS by applying "1+".
It is easily checked that specialising Fig. 2 to wlp and wp produces the only the changes shown in Fig. 3 .
Invariant=variant reasoning for loops
In this section we use the wp and wlp logics to generalise a rule allowing the separation of invariant=variant reasoning for probabilistic programs. It forms the second main contribution of this paper. We begin with a discussion of the standard case.
The standard rule follows from the so-called 'coupling law' [10] :
wlp:prog:A ∧ wp:prog:true ⇒ wp:prog:A;
where prog is a program and A a predicate and we are using (though only here) the original meanings for wp and wlp [3] , with ⇒ for 'implies at all states'.
Law (7) implies that wp.prog and wlp.prog agree on initial states from which termination is guaranteed, and thus it underlies the practical treatment of looping programs -to prove total correctness of an iteration the work is divided between ensuring partial correctness (with a loop invariant), and an independent termination argument (with a variant). It is the probabilistic coupling Theorem 5.2 that allows a similar treatment for probabilistic looping programs. Crucial here is the idea that probabilistic judgements may be modularised, even for recursion where the ÿnal distribution may be made up of many small probabilistic choices resolved in preceeding recursive steps. In standard semantics modular reasoning is possible because wp and wlp are conjunctive (provided by Dijkstra's healthiness condition). For probabilistic semantics, our characterisation Theorem 3.11 supplies above all sublinearity, and we consider next how to use it to replace conjunction of predicates with an appropriate alternative deÿned for expectations.
We deÿne probabilistic conjunction [25] for nonnegative expectations ; :
where is pointwise maximum between expectations. Probabilistic conjunction reduces to ordinary conjunction when specialised to predicates. 11 Its importance in probabilistic reasoning is that it subdistributes through both wp and wlp images of programsanother consequence of sublinearity. Next, we deal with coupling -Theorem 5.2, generalising (7), is the main result of this section. 0 otherwise: 12 One might have guessed that is the appropriate generalisation of ∧ -but does not (even sub-) distribute [11, 25] . Having established wp:r:( & ) W wp:r: + wlp:r: − 1, we conclude by taking 0 on both sides: since on the left it has no e ect, we achieve our result.
As a corollary we recover the standard rule (generalised) for combining partial and total correctness. As a special case note that the wlp result implies the wp result at those states from which termination occurs with probability 1 -where wp:r:1 ≡ 1 -because (&1) is the identity.
Our results so far have been specialised to discrete distributions over a countable state space S, using the at domain. In the next section we show that with only a little more work, and provided our underlying state space has a more sophisticated structure (than that of the at domain), the constructions apply even to continuous distributions, over the reals.
Continuous probability distributions
In this section we indicate how our results can be extended to continuous probability distributions. The goal is to obtain a program semantics supporting probabilistic assignments in which the selection ranges over probability distributions, such as the uniform distribution over a compact subset of the reals, together with a quantitative logic in which the expressions are integrable real-to-real functions. Kozen [13] explores the relation between the Smyth order on (deterministic) programs and continuous probability distributions via a metric on measures -the measures themselves are (as usual) based on the Borel ÿeld generated by 'open' intervals of the real line. For the present more general context (Egli-Milner order and demonically nondeterministic programs) we must make ÿner distinctions between programs and in consequence we use instead a domain of 'continuous valuations'. 13 In order to apply the decomposition results of Section 2, we need to ÿnd a complete partial order of measures (over the reals) satisfying the assumptions of Corollary 2.2. Because of that, the traditional approach to measure theory is not appropriate, as it fails to be !-continuous.
14 Fortunately, however, the more general presentation of Edalat [4] (in which we ÿnd standard measure theory as a special case) does not have this problem, and thus we shall use that for the construction of our program semantics. We begin by reviewing the main ingredients of his work.
Edalat's idea is to consider the Borel ÿeld generated by (open) sets of compact intervals (rather than of points). for any x¡y where (x; y) denotes the open interval between x and y. We shall denote this Scott topology by V.
Next, we deÿne the set of 'continuous valuations' over V -they will be used to model our continuous probability measures over R. A function G : V → R is said to be a (continuous) valuation over V if it satisÿes the following properties [8] : Roughly speaking, valuations di er from measures in that they are deÿned only on the open sets of the topology; but they can be extended to measures on the full Borel ÿeld (generated by the topology). Valuations also have an order induced by the underlying on V: for valuations G and G we say that
(Note that this deÿnition reduces to Deÿnition 2.3 in the context of Section 2, since in the Scott topology of the at domain all sets are open, and in particular singleton sets are.) We denote the space of continuous valuations over V by ( V; ). An important property of continuous valuations is that they can be approximated by directed sets of 'simple valuations' [4] . A valuation F is said to be simple if it can be expressed as a ÿnite sum, that is
where a 1 ; : : : ; a n are nonnegative reals whose sum is no more than 1, and d denotes a point measure, deÿned
for any subset X of V.
Denoting by EV the continuous functions 15 V → R, we deÿne integration of a function ÿ in EV with respect to a simple valuation (as for F above):
Next, for any G, we deÿne the integral
where G is any directed set of simple valuations with limit G. Well deÿnedness is proved elsewhere [4, 5] .
Our interest in valuations is twofold:
• Ordinary Lebesgue integration (and Riemann-Stieltjes integration, the technique for evaluating expectations with respect to probability distributions) can be formulated in terms of valuations and continuous functions [4] : for example an (ordinary) continuous function 16 likewise, an ordinary (probability) measure is found more generally as the extension of a directed limit of simple valuations. The uniform distribution over the compact set [a; b] for example is the limit (as n approaches inÿnity) of the chain of simple valuations,
) is an !-continuous directed-complete partial order: we take as the basis the subset of the simple valuations which only involve rationals (the point valuations are given by intervals with rational endpoints, and the coe cients in the ÿnite sum are also rational).
Thus ( V; ) enjoys !-continuity whilst supporting standard integration of probability measures -and those two features together make it appropriate for our application to program semantics, for which we now set out the details. Likewise the order on transformers is as for Deÿnition 3.4:
where PV and NV are, respectively, the nonnegative and nonpositive subsets of EV. With these deÿnitions we have the analogues of Sections 3 and 4:
• For program r in MV, the transformer ewp:r, is well deÿned as a function EV → EV. It is directed-continuous and sublinear.
• ewp is an embedding of programs into transformers: We end this section by deÿning the transformer semantics for programs over the reals, set out in Fig. 4 .
The most notable di erence between Figs. 4 and 2 is the semantics for conditional choice where, for continuous distributions, there is the possibility of aborting if the 'input interval' cannot be determined to lie entirely within or without the condition B. That choice is explained mathematically by the need to deÿne a continuous transformer, and operationally by the intuition that programs cannot in general compute the function 'equals' over the reals. Practically, it means that the only semantics we can give to the program (x := 1) if x¿0 else (x := 0); implies that it must abort at x = 0 when x ranges over the type of reals. Escardo [6] discusses this and other issues arising in semantics of real-valued computations.
Conclusion
Our main theoretical contribution is a logical characterisation of an operational model based on the Plotkin powerdomain of probability distributions; it is applicable to probabilistic sequential programs and can be used in the analysis of probabilistic distributed algorithms. The logic extends Morgan [20] , Jones [11] and Kozen [14] , for among the concepts probability, nondeterminism and nontermination, it encapsulates all three.
The healthiness conditions embodying the characterisation guide our generalisation of the rule modularising partial and total correctness, and as such represents a considerable step in the available proof methods for probabilistic algorithms; that rule forms our second contribution.
Jones [11] deÿnes a partial correctness logic based on expectations, but only for nondemonic programs, and she does not discuss the healthiness conditions on which the applicability of such logics (as calculational tools) depends. It was the realisation [20] that adding nondeterminism to Kozen's model corresponds to a weakening of the additive property of his logic to sublinearity that makes proofs such as in Theorem 5.2 and those in [17] reduce to simple arithmetic arguments. The use of general expectations (thus superseding purely nonnegative expectations [20] ) leads to an even simpler presentation of sublinearity -the more useful of the three healthiness conditions described here.
A key feature of the operational model is the imposition of convexity (linear interpolation) between distributions, for it allows programs to be characterised exactly at the logical level (Theorem 3.7). That feature is not usually present in other treatments of probability and nondeterminism: Segala [24] for example has no wp=wlp-style program logic in his model for distributed systems (though he does consider temporal logic), and indeed he does not explore the relationship between logical models and partial orders as we do here.
However, convexity has more uses than logical characterisation: the lack of the convex healthiness condition, for example, means that even at the operational level, the reverse subset inclusion relation between sets of outputs (the usual deÿnition for program reÿnement) must be augmented by the explicit addition of the law p ⊕ [24] . With convexity the law is automatic. More generally, operational models that enforce convexity also satisfy other nice algebraic laws between program constructs [9] .
There are two immediate applications. The ÿrst is the discovery of proof rules for loops in which partial and total correctness are separated: with wp and wlp together, using the theory of this paper, it can be shown [17] that I G V wp:body:I probabilistic invariant preserved by loop body is su cient for I V wp:(do G → body od):(I ¬G) provided I V T , where T gives for each initial state the probability of the loop's termination. That rule is standard for nonprobabilistic programs and thus we give for the ÿrst time its generalisation.
The second application concerns abstraction. In some cases it is useful to analyse a probabilistic algorithm by 'converting' all its probabilistic choices to demonic, and showing it remains correct even then -but only if it terminates. That requires wlp. A separate (explicitly probabilistic) argument shows the chance of termination. Putting the correct-if-terminates (wlp) and the termination (wp) results together uses the techniques we have presented here. Algorithms falling into that category typically use randomisation as a method for searching a large space of potential witnesses, and examples include ÿnding perfect hash functions and ÿnding irreducible polynomials [26] .
Appendix A. Separation lemmas
Lemma A.1. The separating hyperplane lemma. Let C be a convex and (limit-) closed subset of R N ; and let F be a point in R N that does not lie in C. Then there is a separating hyperplane with F on one side of it and all of C on the other.
Proof. See for example Trustrum [27] .
Our use in Lemma 3.6, for example, is based on interpreting the 'projection' (see below) of a valuation F as a point in R N , and an expectation as the collective normal of a family of parallel hyperplanes. The integral F then gives the constant term for the -hyperplane that passes through the projection of the point F, where in this context can be interpreted as the constant term for the -hyperplane that touches K, with its normal pointing into K. Thus, when specialised for the applications in this paper, the lemma implies a more general separation: that if F = ∈ C for some compact and up-closed (or Scott-closed) convex set of valuations C, then there is an expectation with (We do not need to vary , since decreasing it increases the open set, thus the ÿnite subcover given by compactess can be replaced by another in which the value of ¿0 is the same in all sets, as shown.)
Consider now the element and subsets in R n deÿned: By choice of O i we have that F = ∈ O i for any i and thus (since ¿0) that F = ∈ sc:C , where sc:C denotes the closure of C in the Euclidean metric on R n ; moreover sc:C is convex and up-closed (because C is). Now applying Lemma A.1 to sc:C we ÿnd a (nonnegative) hyperplane (b 1 ; : : : ; b n ) such that 
Finally, we deÿne
where X is the characteristic function on X which evaluates to 1 at points in X and zero elsewhere. It is a continuous function if X is Scott-open, and (nonnegative) sums of such functions are also continuous.
The lemma now follows since G ÿ = 16i6n b i × G:X i for any valuation G, which on substitution for the summations in (9) gives us the required inequality.
The alternative case, that of separating a point from a Scott-closed subset, can be proved similarly, and the details appear elsewhere [16] . 
